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I.

INTRODUCTION
Fatou Bensouda remembers being a strong proponent of human

rights even at a young age in her hometown in Gambia.1

From a

formative age and throughout her life, she has followed a path
always leading toward justice.2

Elected as deputy prosecutor at

the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2004, Bensouda was
then elected as the first female prosecutor at the ICC in 2011.3
In her role as Prosecutor for the ICC Bensouda is responsible
for determining cases that should be heard before the Court,
gathering facts from the States concerned in the matter, and
helping to determine whether the Office should proceed with

1

See David Pilling, Fatou Bensouda: ‘It’s about the law. It’s

not about power,’ FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 25, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/beeb8dba-ce3c-4a33-b319-3fcff0916736
(recalling that at age eleven, Bensouda’s response to domestic
abuse was “even at that age, I would say ‘No. That is wrong.’”).
2

See e.g., id. (discussing Bensouda’s advocacy for women in

abusive households in her home village and her advisory role
within the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
3

See e.g., id. (detailing Bensouda’s legal background in private

practice and her public interest work with the UN and the ICC).

1

investigations.4

These investigatory actions involve a multi-

phase process where each phase may result in the case being
dismissed and not proceeding to trial.5

To pass even the

preliminary phases, it must be shown that the ICC has
jurisdiction to hear the case.6
In April 2020 the ICC reauthorized an investigation into
alleged acts of torture, cruel treatment, and other war crimes
committed by the United States in Afghanistan.7

4

As a result of

See The Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary

Examination Activities 2020,INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1, 3 (2020),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2020-PE/2020-pe-reporteng.pdf (describing the multi-phase process of proceeding with a
case within the ICC as hinging on consideration of jurisdiction,
admissibility, and the interests of justice).
5

See id. at 68 (detailing that Ukraine has been under

preliminary examination for over six years - since April 2014).
6

See id. at 3 (listing two elements of establishing jurisdiction

as (i) temporal jurisdiction (whether the action took place
after the Rome Statute came into force) and (ii) either
territorial or personal jurisdiction (whether the crime was
committed on the territory or by a national of a State Party)).
7

Owen Bowcott, Senior ICC Judges Authorise Afghanistan War

2

the renewed investigation into these alleged war crimes, former
President Trump declared a national emergency and authorized
imposition of sanctions against anyone found to be supporting
the ICC’s investigation.8

The Trump administration believed the

investigations constituted a direct attack on the safety of
United States citizens who may be implicated in the proceedings.9
Although Bensouda stated that as Prosecutor for the ICC, she
approaches all of her cases with the mindset that no matter who
the defendant is, “it’s about the law. It’s not about the
power[,]” the Trump administration believed her actions were a

Crimes Inquiry, The Guardian (Mar. 5, 2020 5:04 AM)
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/mar/05/senior-icc-judgesauthorise-afghanistan-war-crimes-inquiry (announcing that ICC
judges overturned a cessation of inquiries and reauthorized
investigation of CIA black sites and activities in Afghanistan).
8

See Exec. Order No. 13928, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,139, 36,139 (June

11, 2020) [hereinafter E.O. 13928] (declaring a national
emergency due to the ICC’s “illegitimate” claim of jurisdiction
over and investigation into the U.S.’s actions in Afghanistan).
9

See e.g., Remarks to the Press, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of

State (June 11, 2020) (on file with author) (painting a mental
image of a U.S. citizen being imprisoned in a foreign prison
during vacation as a result of the ICC’s investigations).

3

threat to national security.10

Due to her continued work for the

ICC, the United States State Department placed Bensouda and
another prominent ICC figure on the Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons List (the “SDN List”).11

As a

result of this designation any assets Bensouda possessed in the
United States or that fell under the jurisdiction of the United
States were blocked (i.e. frozen), and she was prohibited from
accessing them.12

10

Further, due to the nature of the designation,

See David Pilling, supra note 1 (demonstrating Bensouda’s

commitment to justice and her unwillingness to be intimidated).
11

See Press Statement, Michael P. Pompeo, Secretary of State,

Secretary of State, Actions to Protect U.S. Personnel From
Illegitimate Investigation by the International Criminal Court
(Sept. 2, 2020) (on file with author) (announcing Bensouda and
Mochochoko’s blocking from support of U.S. Persons because of
their involvement with ICC investigations into U.S. personnel).
12

See E.O. 13928, supra note 8 (prohibiting the making of

contributions in funds, goods, or services to designated
individuals directly or indirectly); see also Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN) Human
Readable List https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financialsanctions/specially-designated-nationals-and-blocked-persons-

4

U.S. Persons who supported Bensouda directly or indirectly
through monetary transactions or professional support were
exposed to potential liability.13
Bensouda is only one individual on the SDN List though; the
power of the President to enact similar restrictions on
individuals, countries, or organizations is vested by the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).14

Under the

same executive order (E.O.). that authorized the designation of
Bensouda on the SDN List, Phakiso Mochochoko – the Head of the
Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division of the

list-sdn-human-readable-lists [hereafter SDN List] (explaining
that when someone is designated to the SDN List all assets
obtained via the United States will be blocked automatically).
13

See Exec. Order No. 13928 supra note 8 at §3(a)-(b)

(reiterating that direct and indirect support of designated
individuals or the receiving of direct or indirect support from
a designated individual is prohibited for all U.S. persons).
14

Accord Adam Szubin, Sanctions 101, Part I of II: A Powerful

Financial Tool, TREASURY NOTES BLOG (May 30, 2014) (granting the
President, under IEEPA, the power to declare national
emergencies and impose financial sanctions in response to
subjectively categorized national security threats).

5

ICC - was designated.15

These two human rights activists are

listed alongside known terrorists,16 narcotics traffickers,17 and
other parties affiliated with sanctioned countries.18

Since

1990, Presidents have declared multiple new national emergencies
each year and reaffirmed existing emergencies, resulting in the
average national emergency under IEEPA lasting nearly a decade
with more than thirty concurrent IEEPA sanctions programs active
at the time of writing this Comment.19

15

See Press Release, Secretary of State, supra note 11

(announcing Bensouda and Mochochoko’s designation under the ICC
sanctions regime for supporting investigating U.S. personnel).
16

See e.g., Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept.

25, 2001) [hereinafter E.O. 13224] (designating multiple parties
who are known associates of terrorist organizations).
17

See e.g., Foreign Narcotics Designation Act, Letter Reporting

on Sanctions, 36 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1262 (June 1, 2000)
(announcing twelve individuals to be sanctioned pursuant to
§804(b) of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Act).
18

See Adam Szubin, supra note 14 (explaining that OFAC draws on

public and private information when making designations).
19

See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY

ET AL,

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45618,

INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION,

6

AND

USE 18

This Comment argues that IEEPA has granted the President of
the United States too much unilateral power to determine the
course of global economic interactions and individuals’ access
to resources, and that this power should be limited by the
judiciary by expanding the use of First Amendment protections
for those who face liability resulting from interactions with
parties on the SDN List.20

Part II describes the statutory

history of IEEPA, the use of presidential power granted by IEEPA
to determine the course of United States foreign affairs and
political relationships, and the case law precedent surrounding
First Amendment constitutional challenges to IEEPA.21

Part III

argues that the current use of IEEPA allows the President to
violate the First Amendment and Congress’s intent in drafting

(2020) (reporting that 1.5 new national emergencies are declared
and an average of 4.5 E.O.’s citing IEEPA are issued per year).
20

See infra Part III and IV (arguing that the Judiciary can

limit the President’s power under IEEPA by using a modified
First Amendment intermediate scrutiny test to protect global
citizens from the unilateral influence of one individual).
21

See infra Part II (establishing the procedural history of

IEEPA and related statutes, the resulting lack of controls put
on the President, a summary of First Amendment challenges to
IEEPA, and historically used intermediate scrutiny tests).

7

and amending IEEPA, and proposes a new test to be employed by
the judiciary to protect First Amendment rights in IEEPA cases.22
Part IV recommends that First Amendment rights create a weighty
and important policy compelling federal courts to use their
interpretation power to constrain the President’s actions under
IEEPA, and argues that the judiciary exercising this power
allows for free speech protection in the absence of a
Congressional amendment to IEEPA passing.23

Part V concludes by

reiterating that sanctions have a distinct purpose and IEEPA has
historically allowed the President to go beyond this purpose and
hold too broad of unilateral power, and thus should be
constrained in the interest of First Amendment rights.24

22

See infra Part III (asserting that the current use of IEEPA by

the President violates the legislative intent of the statute and
proposing a modified intermediate scrutiny test to protect First
Amendment freedom of speech from undue restrictions).
23

See infra Part IV (recommending that the protection of First

Amendment rights is crucial for the courts to uphold and
asserting that this is within the court’s power and in the best
interest of justice for courts to limit IEEPA power in the
absence of congress amending IEEPA).
24

See infra Part V (concluding that the President’s broad powers

8

II.

BACKGROUND
A.

History of IEEPA

Economic sanctions are used by the United States as a
strategic mechanism to alter the behaviors and decisions of
state and nonstate actors that threaten the security of the
United States or its interests.25

Currently the primary

authority for enacting economic sanctions is IEEPA, but IEEPA’s
predecessor - that authorized many of the same actions - was the
Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).26

TWEA was enacted by

Congress, in part, to grant the President broad power to take
control of private property for public use during times of war.27

under IEEPA are ultimately harmful to American citizens and the
global economy and must be constrained).
25

See Perry S. Bechky, Sanctions and the Blurred Boundaries of

International Economic Law, 83 MO. L. REV. 1, 1 (2018) (positing
that economic sanctions are political and economic tools used by
powerful governments to influence other nations).
26

See H.R. REP. NO 95-459, at 2 (1977) (detailing that IEEPA

adopts many of the powers from TWEA, but not all).
27

See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY

ET AL,

supra note 19at 5-6 (stating that

TWEA granted the executive control over international trade,
investment, migration, and communications between the United
States and its enemies).

9

In the 1970s Congress formed a bipartisan commission to
reevaluate the necessity and extent of power granted to the
President under TWEA after realizing that the United States was
under a continuous state of national emergency for over three
decades.28

As a result of the findings of this commission,

Congress moved to reform the emergency powers under TWEA by
first enacting the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and
IEEPA shortly thereafter.29

As a strategy to constrain the

executive’s unilateral power, IEEPA was to confer specific
powers to the President in times of national emergencies that
narrowed the scope of TWEA and imposed more oversight via
procedural limitations.30

28

See id. at 6-7, n.45 (stating that the Special Committee

reevaluated the delegation of emergency authority to the
President and concluded that “the United States had technically
‘been in a state of national emergency since March 9, 1933’”).
29

See id. at 8-9 (explaining that the NEA gives power to IEEPA

and the purpose of enacting IEEPA was to create more oversight
for the President and limit certain powers to emergencies).
30

See id. at 7 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-459 (1977)) (acknowledging

that Congress was worried TWEA granted the President too great
of unilateral power).

10

i.

Statutory Limitations on IEEPA Powers, Namely
the Berman Amendment.

A number of items are categorically exempted from
presidential influence under IEEPA: namely humanitarian aid,
travel and travel related activities, exchange of informational
material, and personal communications.31

These exemptions serve

as the primary limitations on the President’s use of IEEPA
because Congress’s oversight power requires a veto-proof
majority to overturn the President’s actions under IEEPA.32

Many

of the exceptions existed in the original drafting of IEEPA but
as the result of a later amendment - commonly known as the
Berman Amendment or informational materials exemption - IEEPA
also protects the exchange of informational material.33

31

See also 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1)-(4) (excepting personal

communication, certain donations, exportation of informational
materials, and travel related transactions as the only statutory
restrictions on presidential sanction power).
32

See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that a

veto provision is unconstitutional if it allows one House of
Congress to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch).
33

See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3) (amending the IEEPA to protect

exchange of “information or informational materials” and
including a non-exhaustive list of examples).

11

The Berman Amendment was legislated in response to worries
that the President had too much power to infringe on
constitutional rights with the breadth of economic sanctions.34
The text reads, in part, “[t]he authority granted to the
President by this section does not include the authority to
regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly . . . the
importation from any country, or the exportation to any country,
. . . of any information or informational materials” and goes on
to enumerate a non-exhaustive list of items that are protected.35
The Amendment was adopted in 1979 and risked becoming obsolete
in an age of technology if not for the key phrase “included but
not limited to,” that gave courts the power to maintain the
Amendment’s relevance.36

34

On the plain language of the Amendment,

See Revision of Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup of H.R.

7738 Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977) (believing that TWEA must be reformed
because the statute granted the President “dictatorial powers”).
35

See 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3) (“including but not limited to,

publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs,
microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks,
and news wire feeds”).
36

See e.g., Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1549, 1551

12

it applies to imports and exports from countries, but does not
specify how the exception should be applied when individuals or
organizations are sanctioned.37

Courts have disregarded this

plain reading of the Amendment in many cases and opted to read
the text without consideration for the word “country” as a
defining aspect.38

For example, following Donald Trump’s

declaration of a national emergency and attempt to impose
sanctions on TikTok, the court in Marland v. Trump held that the
videos created and distributed on the social media platform
constitute informational material that are protected by the

(S.D. Fla, 1989) (holding that although art is not enumerated
artwork falls under the “and other informational materials”
classification and is protected by the Berman Amendment
regardless of alleged propagandic content).
37

Compare 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3) (specifying it relates to

importation and exportation of information to countries) with 50
U.S.C. §1702(b)(2) (lacking reference to country or territory).
38

See e.g., Marland v. Trump, No. 20-4597, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis

202572, at *23 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 20, 2020) (stating that the
TikTok prohibition indirectly regulates the exchange of
informational materials on the web application).

13

Berman Amendment.39

This interpretive move has allowed courts to

maintain the Amendment’s relevance in an era of globally
reaching technology.40

ii. Presidential Powers and Procedure Under IEEPA
Under IEEPA, the President’s powers may only be exercised
“to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat” that
originates outside of the United States but nevertheless has a
substantial impact on “the national security, foreign policy, or
economy.”41

If the President perceives and declares such a

national emergency, they may then act pursuant to the procedure
in the NEA and promulgate sanctions using IEEPA.42

39

Once the

See id. at *25 (finding that the sanctions against TikTok

would have the effect of preventing the exchange of
informational materials created and posted to the app).
40

See id. at *20 (finding that videos on TikTok are protected

because they are analogous to artwork, photographs, and films).
41

See 50 U.S.C § 1701 (stating that IEEPA may be applied to any

unusual and extraordinary threat with minimal limitation on the
subjectively perceived threat).
42

See National Emergencies Act, 94 Pub. L. 412, 90 Stat. 1255

(1976) (conferring power to IEEPA as a statute that may
promulgate economic sanctions and that is then given over to the

14

President has declared a national emergency and created a
sanctions structure under IEEPA, they must immediately report to
Congress specifying (1) the circumstances that necessitate the
exercise of their IEEPA authority; (2) why they believe the
situation constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States; (3) the specific authorities to be exercised and actions
planned; (4) why they believe those actions are necessary; and
(5) any foreign countries against which actions are to be taken
including why those actions are necessary.43

This process is

typically accomplished through the use of a Presidential E.O.
that is published in the Federal Register stating that there is
an extraordinary and unusual threat that must be neutralized or
addressed.44

IEEPA further requires the President to consult

President’s use by Congress).
43

See 50 U.S.C. § 1703(b) (directing the President to notify

Congress, within a short period of time, of any subjective
reasons for declaring a national emergency).
44

See Ari Shapiro, What a President Can Do Under the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act, NPR ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED (May 31, 2019) https://www.npr.org/2019/05/31/728754901
(maintaining that the President need only issue an E.O. with the
magic words “extraordinary and unusual threat”).

15

with Congress “in every possible instance” before exercising
IEEPA authorities.45

Under the NEA an emergency declared by the

President under IEEPA may only be terminated by the President, a
resolution of Congress with a veto-proof majority, or if the
President does not follow proper procedure in continuing the
properly publish notice of continuation of the emergency.46

iii. Office of Foreign Asset Control Implementation
Power
As the statute currently stands, the President has the
power - after the proper procedure is effectuated - to freeze
assets of foreign individuals, organizations, or countries
deemed to fall under the national emergency.47

45

This is not an

See, 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (codifying the requirement that

Congress be consulted “whenever possible” without specifying the
subject matter or form of the consultation).
46

See 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (mandating that a declaration of

continued emergency must be published ninety days prior to its
annual anniversary to continue the emergency for the next year,
but if this is not done a new emergency may be declared
regarding the same event).
47

See 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (granting Presidents the power to

investigate and block individuals as necessary within the
economic sanctions and international trade regimes).

16

action that the President themselves generally perform though,
this enforcement power is delegated by the President to the
Department of Treasury and its Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC).48

Because the President and OFAC do not typically have

jurisdiction or power to directly control the foreign threat
identified, the focus of enforcement is on transactions within
the United States and on U.S. Persons, wherever located.49

These

controls are actualized as prohibitions, rules, and licenses
published by the Department of Treasury in the Code of Federal
Regulations and on OFAC’s website that must be complied with by
all U.S. Persons and other persons subject to U.S.
jurisdiction.50

When OFAC determines a person meets certain

criteria articulated in a sanctions program, OFAC “designates”

48

See S. REP. NO. 110-82, at 1-2 (2007) (detailing the

President’s power to propose the imposition of economic
sanctions and OFAC’s designated duty to be administrator and
enforcer of sanctions related activity).
49

See 31 C.F.R. §560.314 (2021) (defining U.S. persons as a U.S.

citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under U.S.
law, or any person physically located in the United States).
50

See e.g., 31 C.F.R. §560.201 (specifying OFAC’s regulations

prohibiting the importation of goods from Iran and obtaining
power, in part, through the pronouncement of E.O 12613).

17

the person, meaning the person becomes listed on the SDN List
which is published on OFAC’s website as well as the Federal
Register.51

The penalty for violating sanctions and dealing with

blocked persons or countries is multifold and varies from strict
liability with civil damages to criminal liability enforced by
the Department of Justice.52

Individuals may be removed from the

SDN List as the result of a terminated national emergency, a
successful petition for removal from the SDN list, or as a
result of other extraordinary circumstances.53

51

See SDN List, supra note 12 (publishing a list of individuals

determined, by the government, to be acting on behalf of or in
support of sanctioned governments or activities).
52

See Inflation Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties, 86 Fed.

Reg. 14,534, 14,535 (Mar. 17, 2021) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
pt. 501) (announcing adjusted civil penalty for IEEPA sanctions
to be a maximum of $311,532); see also Amber Vitale, et al, OFAC
Will See You Now, HARV. L. FORUM

ON

CORP. GOV. (Feb. 2, 2021),

https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/02/02/ofac-will-see-younow/ (averring that OFAC and DOJ’s separate charging structures
permit civil and criminal penalties for the same infraction).
53

See 31 CFR § 501.807 (permitting any designated person to

challenge their designation if they believe there was

18

B.

Current Trends of IEEPA Sanctions

Although IEEPA was initially implemented to constrain
Presidential emergency authority, IEEPA had the effect of
expanding the scale, scope, and frequency of Presidential
emergency authority usage.54

Emergencies under IEEPA have a

tendency to span longer periods of time compared to those
declared under TWEA, and consequentially the number of ongoing
national emergencies has continued to increase almost
continuously since the enactment of IEEPA.55

For instance, the

insufficient basis for their designation originally), see also
Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions, 86 Fed. Reg. 22101, 22102
(Apr. 26, 2021) (removing Bensouda and Mochochoko from the SDN
List as a result of President Biden’s E.O. terminating the
national emergency with regards to the ICC).
54

See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY

ET AL,

supra note 19 at 8, 17 (reporting

that over forty-three years Presidents invoked IEEPA in fiftynine national emergencies with thirty-three concurrent
emergencies involving IEEPA active as of July 1, 2020).
55

Compare id. at 18-19 (stating that the longest standing IEEPA

sanctions regime was declared in 1979 and is still in effect)
with FRANK CHURCH
EMERGENCY POWERS

AND

IN THE

CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, Forward, A BRIEF HISTORY
UNITED STATES,

A

19

WORKING PAPER, at v (1974)

OF

first national emergency declared under IEEPA was declared in
1979 and as of March 2021 is still active.56

While all

emergencies declared under TWEA were geographically tied, under
IEEPA non-geographically-specific emergencies are declared with
more frequency.57

Declarations of emergencies in response to

amorphic non-geographically-specific threats has resulted in
effectuating broad application of sanctions.58

Sanctions

programs or regimes are currently in place for threats such as
the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons59 and

(observing that Presidents used TWEA to keep America under
national emergencies for sixty-four consecutive years).
56

See Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to

Iran, 85 Fed. Reg. 72895, 72895 (Nov. 12, 2020) (reaffirming the
emergency declared in November 1979 for the forty-second year).
57

See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY

ET AL,

supra note 19 at 17 (positing that

Presidential use of national emergencies expanded in scale,
scope, and frequency under IEEPA as the successor to TWEA).
58

See id. (observing that non-geographic IEEPA sanctions

authorize targeting persons and groups instead of governments).
59

See Exec. Order. No. 13382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,565 (June 28,

2005) (designating organizations believed to be proliferating
weapons of mass destruction).

20

threats to commit terrorism.60

In addition to these nebulous

threats, the stated reasons for declaring a national emergency
allow vague statements to qualify a situation as a national
emergency thus allowing the President to target organizations,
groups, or individuals.61

C.

Constitutional ties to IEEPA.

When plaintiffs challenge IEEPA on Fifth Amendment grounds
they generally fail regardless of whether the allegation is of
an unconstitutional taking, unconstitutional vagueness, or
otherwise.62

60

Challenges to IEEPA itself as being

See Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23,

2001) (blocking the property of persons who commit or support
terrorism by freezing their assets connected to the U.S.).
61

See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY

ET AL,

supra note 19 at 21 (explaining

that rationales initially included reference to specific
geography or actions of a government, but rational is now
vague); see e.g., Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729
(Nov. 14, 1979) (referencing, vaguely, “the situation in Iran”
as grounds for declaring a national emergency).
62

See e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219

F.Supp. 2d 57, 78 (D.D.C. 2003) (indicating that assets blocked
pursuant to IEEPA sanctions are not unconstitutional takings

21

unconstitutional also fail as courts recognize that Congress was
within its right to grant the President the statutory authority
and the President is permitted to delegate granted authorities
to other government agencies.63

The most successful IEEPA

challenge are First Amendment challenges arguing that IEEPA
infringes on plaintiff’s freedom of speech.64

i. Grounds for First Amendment Challenges
The text of the First Amendment protects against acts that
infringe on freedoms of speech, press, peaceful assembly, and
petition.65

Throughout years of First Amendment caselaw, the

Supreme Court has expanded First Amendment protections to
include more activities categorized under the four areas of

because the taking is temporary).
63

See e.g., United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 212–13 (2d

Cir. 2006) (holding that IEEPA constitutes an appropriate
delegation of congressional authority to the Executive).
64

See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No.

20Civ.8121, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *29 (S.D.N.Y., Jan.
04, 2021) (holding that the IEEPA sanctions chilled a
significant amount of protected speech activities).
65

See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from making laws

that infringe on the freedom of speech).
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protection listed in the text.66

To bring a case under the First

Amendment a plaintiff must have standing, a justiciable claim,
and establish a challenge on one of two grounds: facial
challenges and/or as-applied challenges.67

Facial challenges

arise when Plaintiffs argue that a law should be invalidated
because the government imposed law, rule, regulation, or policy
is unconstitutional as written.68

Conversely, an as-applied

First Amendment challenge arises when Plaintiffs argue that a

66

See e.g., David L. Hudson Jr., Freedom of Association, The

First Amendment Encyclopedia (2009), https://www.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/1594 (explaining that, although not enumerated
in the First Amendment, the freedom of association is recognized
by courts as a fundamental right).
67

See MARY KEENEY & SUSAN G. CONWAY, CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

STATUTES

AND

TO

STATE

RULES, 1 (17th ed. 2005) (detailing that cases are

permissible to bring to court if the Plaintiff has standing
(real controversy), the question is justiciable (shows a First
Amendment violation is likely to occur), and the case is ripe
(the facts show infringement)).
68

See David L. Hudson Jr., Facial Challenges, The First

Amendment Encyclopedia (2009), https://www.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/954(positing that facial challenges often
allege that laws are overbroad or vague).
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government imposed law, rule, regulation, or policy is
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs’ individual
situation.69

Facial challenges often precede as-applied

challenges, thus when a Plaintiff does not succeed on their
facial challenge they may bring and succeed on an as-applied
challenge.70

Courts have shown a preference for as-applied

challenges to provide a narrower remedy rather than upholding a
facial challenge that may overrule the democratic law making
process.71

Facial and as-applied challenges also result in

different possibilities of relief: facial challenges seek to
invalidate an entire government rule whereas an as-applied
challenge will narrow a government rule’s applicability without

69

See David L. Hudson Jr., As-applied Challenges, The First

Amendment Encyclopedia (2009), https://www.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/892(explaining that as-applied challenges are
used to avoid premature decisions).
70

See David L. Hudson Jr., supra note 64 (reporting that courts

may strike down a facial challenge and subsequently accept an
as-applied challenge on the same facts).
71

See David L. Hudson Jr., supra note 65 (stating that courts

prefer as-applied challenges, but some courts struggle to
delineate between the categories).
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abolishing it.72

ii.

First Amendment Challenges to IEEPA Sanctions
Regimes

Historically, the most successful arguments challenging
IEEPA sanctions have been First Amendment challenges claiming a
sanctions regime unduly limits the rights of freedom of speech
or association.73

Not all of these cases have been successful,

for example in Al Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Department of
the Treasury, the court held that IEEPA sanction do not unjustly
infringe on enough of the Plaintiff’s First Amendment free
speech to justify granting an injunction.74

Conversely, the

recent case of Open Society Justice Initiative found that the
only viable path to grant injunctive relief was under the First

72

See id. (emphasizing that as-applied challenges are preferred

by the courts over facial challenges to protect the judiciary
from infringing on executive power).
73

But see Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333

F.3d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the Government’s
actions satisfy necessary scrutiny and do not violate
Plaintiff’s First amendment rights).
74

See 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1267 (holding that Plaintiffs could

not prove using extended hypotheticals that the First Amendment
infringements warranted relief for themselves).
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Amendment.75

In Open Society, the Plaintiffs consisted of

numerous dual-citizen American legal scholars who regularly
worked with the ICC.76

These scholars challenged the

implementation of E.O. 13928 enacting broad sanctions
prohibiting “any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or
services” for any person designated pursuant to the Order.77

The

Plaintiffs only succeed on the First Amendment claim that the
E.O. - and following regulations - unjustly prohibited
Plaintiffs from engaging in certain speech and advocacy in
support of the ICC, and thus exposed Plaintiffs to civil and
criminal liability for engaging in constitutionally protected

75

See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 20Civ.8121,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *31 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 04, 2021)
(holding in favor of the government on Plaintiff’s APA
challenge, Fifth Amendment challenge, and as-applied First
Amendment challenge).
76

See id. at * 11-15 (establishing the Plaintiffs as dual

citizens of the United States and other countries, plus law
professors at four different law schools).
77

See id. at *9 (citing Exec. Order No. 13928, 85 Fed. Reg.

36,139 (June 11, 2020)) (showing that the language of the
executive order provided a broad basis for the sanctions regime
and could encompass a variety of activities and conduct).
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speech or advocacy.78

Although the Government argued that the

regulations were content-neutral and/or justified by the
compelling national security interest, the court found that the
Plaintiff’s interactions with the ICC would likely qualify as a
“service” under the sanctions regime and that this limiting
would be subject to strict scrutiny.79

As a result, injunctive

relief was granted to the Plaintiffs because the E.O.
impermissibly restricted speech protected by the First
Amendment.80

78

See id. at *15-*17 (outlining Plaintiffs’ claims as including

a First Amendment challenge, a Fifth Amendment challenge, an
ultra vires challenge, and a challenge to OFAC’s actions under
the APA; stating that the only claim the Plaintiffs have a
likelihood of succeeding under is the First Amendment claim).
79

See id. at *23-*24 (confirming that the speech-related

activities the Plaintiffs seek to participate in regarding the
ICC likely qualify as services that are “directly or indirectly
in benefit” of SDNs and thus the desired speech is likely to be
prohibited under the Order and the Regulations).
80

Id. at *29-*30, *39 (enjoining the government from enforcing

civil penalties on Plaintiffs’ for the specifically presented
and potentially violative actions).
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iii.

Historically Used First Amendment Tests That May
Apply to IEEPA Litigation.

There are three primary standards used for analyzing
potential First Amendment violations: strict scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.81

In cases

regarding IEEPA and the First Amendment, courts are varied in
application of scrutiny and tests, but strict scrutiny and
intermediate scrutiny are often used interchangeably and come to
similar results.82

Content-neutral regulations are subject to

intermediate scrutiny while content-based regulations are
subject to strict scrutiny.83

81

One intermediate scrutiny test

See David L. Hudson, Jr., Substantial Government Interest, THE

FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA (2019) https://www.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/1615 (explaining that under strict scrutiny
the substantial-government must have an extremely important interest, intermediate scrutiny requires a slightly lesser
“substantial interest,” and rational basis a more lenient
“legitimate interest” must be established).
82

Cf. Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 20Civ.8121,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *30, *29 n.7 (applying strict
scrutiny to the First Amendment challenge but that intermediate
scrutiny would reach the same result).
83

See David L. Hudson, Jr., supra note 75 (stating that rational
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related to IEEPA was used in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno.84
In Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno the court applied four
questions: (1) is the regulation with the power of the
government, (2) does it promote an important or substantial
government interest, (3) is that interest related to suppressing
free expression, and (4) is the incidental restriction on First
Amendment freedoms no greater than necessary?85

There also

exists a final balancing test commonly used that requires the
court to consider the effect of granting or denying relief to
each party with particular attention paid to the public
consequences of granting or denying the relief.86

requires legitimate interest, intermediate requires substantial
interest, and strict requires a compelling interest).
84

Cf. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th

Cir. 2000) (applying an element test to cases of First Amendment
challenges where intermediate scrutiny is necessary).
85

See id. at 1136 (holding in favor of the government and that

all questions were answered in the affirmative).
86

See 725 Eatery Corp. v. N.Y.C., 408 F. Supp. 3d 424, 469

(S.D.N.Y. 2019)) (explaining that courts must balance competing
claims of injury between parties, but in cases where the
government is a party the public’s interest becomes the
pertinent factor rather than the government’s interest).
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III. ANALYSIS
A.

The Scope of Power IEEPA has Granted is Overly Broad
Because It Goes Beyond What Congress Intended When
Drafting the Statute.

The scope of power IEEPA has inadvertently granted the
President runs afoul of IEEPA’s intended purpose of constraining
the President’s power and increasing Congressional oversight.87
The purpose for using IEEPA to amend TWEA was to constrain the
power of the President with congressional review and place a
limit on the over-exuberant use of sanctions, but the result has
expanded presidential power and severely limited congressional
oversight.88

The first sanctions regime put into place under

IEEPA is still in effect today, over forty years after its
inception, and since 1997 consists of a comprehensive sanction

87

See H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 2 (1977) (stating the purpose of

IEEPA was to limit the President’s powers and subject those
powers to stricter oversight mechanisms).
88

See Revision of Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup of H.R.

7738 Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (imploring Congress to adopt the
amendments to TWEA because the statute granted the President
“dictatorial powers” to be used without constraint of Congress).
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regime against the entire country of Iran.89

The long-term

existence of these sanctions directly contradicts the original
belief that IEEPA should be used to authorize controls in times
of national emergency, but should not be used to isolate the
people of the United States from another country long-term.90

In

some instances it is clear that Congress agrees with the
direction of the President’s IEEPA sanctions because they codify
the declaration with legislation, but in other instances it is
unclear if Congress’s lack of action is assent, indifference, or
something else.91

89

See Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to

Iran, 85 Fed. Reg. 72895, 72895 (Nov. 12, 2020) (affirming
continuation of the national emergency declared on Nov. 14, 1979
for the forty-first time), see also Exec. Order No. 13059, 62
Fed. Reg. 44,531 (Aug. 19, 1997) (prohibiting the import or
export of any goods originating in or destined for Iran).
90

See Revision of Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup of H.R.

7738 Before the House Comm. on International Relations, supra
note 79 at 10 (maintaining that the long-term use of total
sanctions is an unwise foreign policy and that enforcement of
such regulations can allow First Amendment infringements).
91

See e.g., Iran and Libya Sanctions Act Of 1996, 104 Pub. L.
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i.

IEEPA’s Breadth of Power Must Be Limited Because
It Currently Permits the President to
Unreasonably Limit First Amendment Freedoms.

IEEPA was meant to preserve constitutional freedoms and
preclude policies that would entirely isolate the United States
from people in other countries.92

The result of sanctions

regimes created under IEEPA has been the opposite: substantially
isolating the United States from specific persons, countries, or
organizations designated under IEEPA and infringing on U.S.
Persons’ First Amendment rights in the process.93

172, 110 Stat 1541 (1996) (legislating, by Congressional vote,
the imposition of sanctions on certain actors in Iran and Libya
for their efforts in obtaining weapons of mass destruction); see
also Exec. Order No. 12959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (May 6, 1995)
(authorizing sanctions against Iran as a result of actions seen
as a threat to United States national security).
92

See Report of the Committee on International Relations on H.R.

7738 at 15-16 (1977) (representing The Committee’s belief that
the First Amendment provides adequate protection for free
speech, and the new statute would not impede that right).
93

See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 20Civ.8121,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405 at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2021)
(holding in favor of Plaintiffs that their rights to free speech
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The isolation caused by sanctions is – to an extent – the
intended purpose of IEEPA: this temporary isolation is used as a
bargaining tool by the United States Government to implore the
sanctioned parties to cease the actions that gave rise to the
sanctions.94

That purpose is suitable for short-term sanctions

but when individuals, countries, and organizations are
sanctioned long-term or without sufficient deliberation, there
is little if any political power left to the sanctions as they
become the status quo.95

The intended use of these emergencies

was meant to be - by their nature – rare, brief, and declared
only when there was a real emergency present, but the reality of

were impacted when they were precluded from supporting the ICC).
94

See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Preface to the Second Edition of

International Economic Law, at 850 (2d ed. 2008) (describing
economic sanction as “economic controls for political ends” that
express the issuing State’s disapproval in an effort to change
the sanctioned parties political or economic practice).
95

See e.g., Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect

to Iran, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,895, 72,895 (Nov. 12, 2020)
(reaffirming sanctions for the thirty-ninth consecutive year
because the “situation” that gave rise to the emergency is still
impacting the United States).
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IEEPA national emergencies has strayed far from that intention.96
For example, the sanctions promulgated against TikTok in 2020
were enacted in a political climate that made it unclear if the
motivation was personal to the President or actually in the best
interest of national security.97

By utilizing the magic words

and claiming there was a “unique and extraordinary threat,” the
President has the power to promulgate sanctions against almost
any party with minimal oversight outside of the statutory
exemptions included in IEEPA.98

96

With the current authority the

See Report of the Committee on international Relations on HR

7738 at 10 (emphasizing that emergencies are rare and should not
be equated with normal problems experienced); but see
Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 85 Fed. Reg.
72,897, 72,897 (Nov. 12, 2020) (continuing a national emergency
first implemented in 1994 for its sixteenth consecutive year).
97

Contra Exec. Order No. 13942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 6,

2020) (claiming that the data collected via the TikTok app
threatened to allow the Chinese Communist Party access to
Americans’ personal information and track Federal employees).
98

See 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1)-(4) (excepting from the Presidents

power the limitation of personal communication that does not
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President holds under IEEPA, sanctions regimes can be
commonplace and grant the President unilateral power to enact
sanctions with minimal justification or accountability before
they go into effect.99
The consequences for violating any IEEPA sanctions are
high: when a U.S. Person makes the business decision to deal
with sanctioned individuals, they run the risk of racking up
hundreds of millions of dollars in strict liability fines or
even jail time.100

In some instances this is logical: if a

include the transfer of value, donations of certain kinds
(unless the President determines they are necessary),
importation and exportation of informational materials, and
transactions incident to travel).
99

See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2021) (excepting proposed rules

involving “foreign affairs” or “military” functions of the
United States from the note and comment process generally
mandated under the APA).
100

See e.g. BNP Paribas SA Settles Potential Civil Liability for

Apparent Violations of Multiple Sanctions Programs 1, 1 (June
30, 2014)
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20140630_bnp.pdf
(announcing that BNNP violated multiple sanctions regimes and
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corporation subject to United States jurisdiction sells items to
a sanctioned country or a person who is known to be dangerous,
it is justifiable that the corporation should be held liable for
this action.101

Such dealings undermine the aforementioned

negotiating power of the United States government and jeopardize
the legitimate government interests in compelling dangerous
actors to cease the activities that threaten U.S. national
security.102

Conversely, when U.S. Persons are seeking to

agreed to pay $963,619,900 for violations with a statutory civil
penalty maximum of $19,272,380,006); see also Inflation
Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties, supra note 50
(announcing adjusted civil penalty for IEEPA sanctions to be a
maximum of $311,532).
101

See e.g., OFAC Settles with Amazon.com, Inc. with Respect to

Potential Civil Liability for Apparent Violations of Multiple
Sanctions Programs 1,3 (July 8, 2020)
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20200708_amazon.pdf
(announcing that Amazon violated multiple sanctions regimes and
fulfilled orders for persons on the SDN List at the time of the
orders; settling for a monetary penalty of $134,523 when the
maximum statutory penalty was $1,038,206,212).
102

See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, supra note 93 (insinuating that

36

support an internationally recognized justice organization or
utilize a social media app, this liability is unreasonable to
extend because there is a risk that there is no legitimate
government interest in seeking to prohibit the actions of the
sanctioned party.103

Because all existing constraints on IEEPA

are limitations on OFAC’s enforcement, it is often unclear to
the individual parties whether their actions will constitute a
violation resulting in strict liability civil penalties.104

economic sanctions are utilized by powerful governments to exert
control over other countries’ actions).
103

See e.g., TikTok v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02658, 2020 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 232977, at *42 (D.D.C. Dec. 07, 2020) (concluding that the
Government violated the APA by preventing a company from
operating in the United States without considering other methods
for resolving the purported national security interest).
104

See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No.

20Civ.8121, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *28 (S.D.N.Y., Jan.
04, 2021) (recounting the government’s argument that the E.O.
did not limit support for other ICC offices without giving a
clear indication of what actions would give rise to liability).
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ii.

Current Use of IEEPA Violates the Purpose of the
Berman Amendment Because the President May
Unconstitutionally Limit Protected Speech.

The motivation behind the enactment of the Berman Amendment
is simultaneously limited and exceptionally broad, but there is
a consensus that the Amendment was meant to provide an
additional layer of statutory protection to preserve First
Amendment rights.105

While the text of the Berman Amendment

applies to informational materials, the vision of Congress in
protecting First Amendment rights extends beyond a strict view
of informational materials.106

The logical reading of the

limited legislative history at hand implies that Congress
intended to protect all materials implicating the First

105

See Cerunda v. Heavy, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1547-48 (S.D. Fla.

1989) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 3, at 113) (indicating
that the Berman Amendment was enacted to codify the ABA’s
resolution regarding First Amendment protections of imports and
applying the concept to exports as well, but noting that nothing
further is stated as legislative history).
106

See H.R. REP. NO. 103-482, at 239 (1994) (Conf. Rep) (positing

that no actions may directly or indirectly limit the import or
export of information protected by the First Amendment).
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Amendment.107

Narrower readings of the Berman Amendment - often

proffered by the government in court - to construe informational
materials narrowly have been rejected.108

Instead, it is

concluded that Congress’s explicit indication that the Berman
Amendment was to protect First Amendment activities negates the
fact that reference to the First Amendment was excluded from the
text of the amendment.109

As such, continued infringement on

First Amendment rights necessarily violates the purpose

107

See Cerunda 720 F. Supp. at 1550 (rejecting the government’s

narrow reading of the Berman Amendment and criticizing their
argument that Congress intended limited First Amendment
protection by using the phrase “informational materials”).
108

See id. at 1550, n. 10 (concluding that Congress’s intent in

enacting the Berman Amendment was to protect any information
covered by the First Amendment).
109

See H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 3, at 113 (1987) (referencing the

A.B.A resolution as the purpose for creating the Berman
Amendment legislation); see also Report No. 1 of the Section of
Administrative Law, 110 ANNU. REP. A.B.A. 467, 517-18 (1985)
(averring that actions protected by the First Amendment, such as
scientific work products and other educational material, must be
protected from the President’s sanction power).
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underlying the Berman Amendment.110
Within the legislative history of the Berman Amendment, the
primary purpose for the legislation is to codify the resolution
adopted by the American Bar Association House of Delegates with
a similar recommendation, as such the House of Delegates
Resolution is intrinsically tied to the legislative purpose
behind the Berman Amendment.111

As the report preceding the

adoption of the Resolution states, Government actions that run
the risk of chilling Constitutionally protected activity should
be viewed with scrutiny.112

110

The conclusion of the report states

See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No.

20Civ.8121, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *31 (S.D.N.Y., Jan.
04, 2021) (holding that should OFAC attempt to enforce sanctions
against the academics’ work products, the Berman Amendment would
protect them because their work was necessarily informational).
111

See H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 3, at 113 (1987) (articulating,

in the only indication of purpose within the document, that the
mission of the amendment was to codify the resolution adopted by
the American Bar Association House of Delegates in 1985).
112

See Report No. 1 of the Section of Administrative Law, 110

ANNU. REP. A.B.A. 467, 517-18 (1985) (arguing that actions
chilling normal and essential scientific activity is a drastic
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that removing the restrictions on First Amendment protected
information would strengthen our constitutional system, and
implores Congress to adopt the recommendations that were
ultimately legislated in the Berman Amendment.113

With this

purpose in mind, it is clear that the current usage of IEEPA –
even with the inclusion of the Berman Amendment – has
disregarded the noble purpose of free flowing information in
favor of restricting a plethora of activities that would make
for a more fully informed and sophisticated citizenry.114

For

example, the restrictions created by E.O. 13928 and the
sanctions against the ICC directly contradicted this purpose by
limiting the free flow of legal scholars’ expertise to an
internationally recognized court and, furthermore, limited the
actions and experiences that law students in American

departure from United States policy and requesting protection of
this ability from interference by the Government).
113

See id. at 518 (asserting that protections of American access

to foreign ideas and people is for the greater good of America
and its citizens).
114

See id. (positing that there should be no restrictions on the

import of information that may be lawfully circulated in the
United States to allow for broader education and expansion of
knowledge of United States citizens).
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universities could take in the course of their studies.115
While courts have begun to realize that the Berman
Amendment and informational materials exceptions reach far
beyond the typical conceptualization of informational materials,
the path to recourse on the matter is still unnecessarily
strenuous.116

Presidents operate with the belief that IEEPA

grants them unlimited power in promulgating these restrictions
and thus the Berman Amendment’s purpose is being repeatedly and
blatantly violated by the Commander-in-Chief whose
responsibility is to protect American safety, not to infringe on

115

See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 405, at *12-*13 (asserting that the sanction on the
ICC caused a Professor of Law at the Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law to abandon plans to supervise student research that would
have been provided to the Office of the Prosecutor and thus
potentially expose the professor to liability).
116

See e.g., TikTok v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02658, 2020 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 232977, at *5, *44 (D.D.C., Dec. 04, 2020) (agreeing with
Plaintiff’s argument that the sanctions promulgated against a
short-loop video sharing app indirectly regulated the exchange
of informational materials).
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constitutional rights.117

Thus, courts’ logic in finding that

the Berman Amendment extends to technologies such as TikTok must
also be extended to protect individuals who are subject to nongeographically specific sanctions.118

A plain reading of the

text is insufficient in instances of non-geographically-specific
sanctions akin to the ICC regime.119

Using the ICC case as an

illustrative example, protection of materials flowing to the
Netherlands – as the seat of the ICC – are irrelevant because
the sanctions apply to a multi-national organization and are

117

See e.g., Trump Twitter Archive,

https://www.thetrumparchive.com/ (type “try looking” into the
search bar) (claiming that he has the right to limit all
business that the United States conducts with Peoples’ Republic
of China because of IEEPA’s power).
118

See Marland v. Trump, No. 20-4597, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis

202572, at *25 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 20, 2020) (holding that
sanctions effectively banning TikTok would prevent the exchange
of informational material because the videos on the app
constitute informational materials).
119

See E.O. 13928, supra note 8 (declaring a national emergency

with respect to the ICC – an organization - and stating that
individuals involved in supporting the organization would be
designated to the SDN List).
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targeted at individuals regardless of their location.120

This is

an instance where the courts must use their interpretation power
to maintain the purpose and relevance of the Berman Amendment to
protect First Amendment rights.121

B.

When Presented with Relevant Cases, The Judiciary Must
Utilize Interpretation Power to Curtail First
Amendment Violations Because Congress’s Oversight
Function is Limited.

Although Congress intended for IEEPA to contain more direct
oversight than TWEA did previously, as a result of Supreme Court
decisions handed down after the inception of IEEPA, Congress
must pass a veto-proof joint resolution as opposed to the
originally intended legislative veto.122

Congress has never

repealed an IEEPA sanction regime or even introduced a

120

Cf. Press Release, ICC, The Registrar Inaugurates the ICC

Field Office in Bangui (Oct. 18, 2007) (listing several field
offices active at the time including operations in Uganda, Chad,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
121

Cf. Marland v. Trump, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 202572, at *24

(extending Berman Amendment informational materials protections
to the exchange of technology created on an application).
122

See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that a

veto provision is unconstitutional because it allows for one
House of Congress to invalidate decisions of the Executive).
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resolution to attempt this, which leaves open the question of
whether the necessity of obtaining a veto-proof majority is too
high for Congresspeople to consider, or whether the current use
of IEEPA has represented Congress’s wishes thus far.123

Courts

historically abide by the latter reasoning and construe
Congress’s lack of action as indication that they are satisfied
with the course of action the President is taking with the IEEPA
sanctions.124

While this is a legitimate assumption, the reality

is that it is significantly more difficult for Congress to
repeal an IEEPA sanction regime than it is for a court to
determine the regime is unconstitutional.125

123

Since Congress is

See P.L. 99-93; 99 Stat. 405 (Aug. 16, 1985) (amending the

NEA as the parent statute of IEEPA in 1985 to require a joint
resolution, which is subject to the President’s veto, to
terminate a national emergency declared by the President).
124

See e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33

(2010) (stating that the Executive is entitled to high levels of
deference when courts consider cases of interest to national
security and foreign affairs).
125

Cf. CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY,

ET AL.,

supra note 19 at 46 (identifying

two resolutions that introduced to attempt a “legislative veto”
and terminate a national emergency under the NEA, neither
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bound to enact a veto-proof resolution, federal courts have a
responsibility to protect Constitutional rights impacted by the
over-exuberant use of IEEPA by the President.126

i.

Federal Courts Should Follow Reasoning akin to
Open Society v. Trump Because the Court Correctly
Reasoned That Some IEEPA Sanctions Regimes
Impermissibly Violate First Amendment Rights.

The use of IEEPA by President Trump exposed a weakness in
the oversight mechanisms in IEEPA, and the prior case law around
the topic only expanded the President’s power by acting in
overly deferential ways.127

Due to the path prior case law was

taking, the President may believe that IEEPA acts as a near
limitless grant of power on matters of foreign trade and policy
when this would go directly against Congress’s purpose in

resolution succeeded and neither resolution was in reference to
an IEEPA emergency).
126

See Sierra Club v Trump, 977 F.3d 853, 865 (asserting that

the Supreme Court’s decision in Chadha made it more difficult
for Congress to check the President’s use of emergency powers
than originally intended).
127

See e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33

(2010) (stating that the Executive deserves highly deferential
treatment when courts consider cases of interest to national
security and foreign affairs).
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enacting the statute.128

By ruling that the freedom of speech

for the Plaintiffs in Open Society was more important than the
government’s interest, the judge opened a small window of
protection that was not previously enforced by the courts, but
is invaluable to have.129
Open Society stands in stark contrast to the other First
Amendment challenges that held categorically “there is no
constitutional right to facilitate terrorism.”130

128

The judge in

See e.g., Trump Twitter Archive,

https://www.thetrumparchive.com/ (type “try looking” into the
search bar) (demonstrating that the President may believe IEEPA
grants them powers that fall far outside of Congress’s intended
grant of power only in times of emergency).
129

See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 20Civ.8121,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *30, *31 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2021)
(holding that the sanctions on the ICC impose content-based and
viewpoint-based restrictions on Plaintiffs due to the language
of the E.O. and thus rejecting the government’s position that
the E.O. was content neutral on its face).
130

See Holy Land Foundation for Relief v. Ashcroft, 333 F. 3d

156, 164 (D.C., 2003) (citing district court proceedings)
(holding Plaintiff could not succeed on their First Amendment
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Open Society correctly highlighted that the activities “for the
benefit” of any persons designated pursuant to an Order is
overbroad and allowed for infringement on First Amendment
rights.131

The language indicated as being restrictive of

actions is included in most declarations of national emergency
issued under IEEPA and thus the reasoning of the court should
broadly be applied as a reasonable constraint of presidential
power by the judiciary.132

This is reconcilable with the narrow

view taken in other cases because it will not expressly allow
for dealing with blocked persons, but instead will give
individuals the opportunity for clarity on what actions will
expose them to liability.133

challenge because their actions were in direct support of
terrorist organizations).
131

See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 405, at *27 (agreeing with Plaintiffs that the language of
the E.O. sweeps more broadly than necessary and limits actions
that do not necessarily need to be limited).
132

See e.g., E.O. 13224, supra note 16 (“any transaction or

dealings by United States person . . . is prohibited, including
. . . for the benefit of such persons”).
133

See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S.
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Although the court in Open Society ultimately came to the
correct conclusion, the use of strict scrutiny to reach that
conclusion was unnecessary.134

The court’s reasoning that speech

is limited by the E.O. based on the content of that speech is
not correct on the face of the E.O.135

As recognized in most

courts, the Executive branch is granted a higher level of
deference when issues of national security are present.136

In

Dist. LEXIS 405 at *25 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)) (explaining that material support to
terrorists is regulated by a test of whether the speech imparts
“specialized knowledge” or only “general unspecialized
knowledge” on the receiving party).
134

See id. at *24 (applying strict scrutiny because a person’s

speech will result in liability if and only if that speech is in
support of blocked individuals).
135

Compare id. at *24 (rejecting the argument that the E.O. was

content neutral and deserved intermediate scrutiny analysis)
with Islamic American Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents,
394 F.Supp 2d 34, 52 (D.D.C., 2005) (accepting that a freedom of
speech challenge to OFAC action warrant intermediate scrutiny).
136

See e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33

(2010) (stating that the President should receive highly
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all cases concerning IEEPA E.O.s national security is an
integral element of the pronouncement of the national emergency
and the promulgation of the related sanctions.137

Courts should

not over correct by being overly deferential to allow the
Executive broader power, but instead must walk a narrow line to
balance deference to presidential power with constraint of
incorrectly used presidential power.138

Some occurrences of

IEEPA challenges will require strict scrutiny when specific
actions of the plaintiff are being infringed upon to control

deferential treatment when courts consider cases of interest to
national security and foreign affairs because the Executive
serves as the primary authority on matters of foreign affairs).
137

See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 405, at *40 (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi 137 S.Ct. 1843,
1862 (1985) (recognizing a significant government interest in
the creation of a sanctions regime, but not as applied to the
scope of First Amendment infringement).
138

See e.g., United States v. Lindh, 212 F.Supp 2d 514, 556-57

(E.D. Va. 2002) (“Conclusive deference, which amounts to
judicial abstention, is plainly inappropriate. Rather, the
appropriate deference is to accord substantial or great weight
to the President's decision”).
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their political association or speech.139

As the judge noted in

Open Society, the case would arrive at the same result if tested
under intermediate scrutiny, and that is the proper standard to
use when considering the limitations on actions for the benefit
of a designated individual.140

Applying strict scrutiny to all

instances of this phrasing would create a slippery slope to
invalidating many E.O.s and IEEPA sanctions programs that
legitimately rely, in part, on that language for power.141
Further, the government has a legitimate interest – in certain

139

Cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project at 25-26 (applying

strict scrutiny to the as-applied challenge to ADEPA because the
speech Plaintiffs were using was political, but choosing not to
apply strict scrutiny to the facial challenge because the
government did not limit all of the pure political speech).
140

See id. at 36 (reasoning that given the sensitive interest of

national security and the Government’s interest in preventing
terrorism, it may be necessary to prohibit the material support
of these organizations even where the First Amendment right of
individuals is infringed upon).
141

See e.g., E.O. 13224, supra note 16 (utilizing the broad

language of “any services” to provide OFAC with the power to
designate and prohibit transacting with individuals who commit,
threaten to commit, or support terrorism).
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circumstances – in broadly limiting actions that will result in
the support of terrorism.142

ii.

Federal Courts Should Apply a Modified
Intermediate Scrutiny Test to IEEPA Cases Because
of the Unique First Amendment Infringements Posed
by Unilateral Presidential Power.

It is proper for courts to analyze First Amendment
challenges regarding IEEPA actions under intermediate scrutiny
in many instances, but the historically used test is inadequate
to protect First Amendment rights impacted by IEEPA backed
sanctions.143

In instances of both intermediate and strict

scrutiny, a test must be used to determine if the restrictions
to the freedom of speech are permissible under the First
Amendment.144

142

See Global Relief Found. Inc., v. O’Neill, 207 F.Supp.2d 779,

806 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (deciding that in instances where speech
and non-speech are comingled, the Government’s interest in
prohibiting the non-speech actions may supersede Plaintiff’s
interest in not having their speech actions controlled).
143

See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135

(9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that intermediate scrutiny is proper
for First Amendment challenges when the law is content-neutral).
144

See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump No.
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While historical tests provide an important baseline, the
elements are often cyclical or self-fulfilling in nature: the
first two elements of the Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno test
are cyclical in nature with the legality of any E.O. under
IEEPA, and the answer will always be yes.145

If the answer to

those questions is no, the E.O. will be struck down on grounds
apart from the First Amendment thus providing no substantial
constitutional protection for First Amendment rights.146

The

third element of that test is useful for identifying if the
regulation is facially unconstitutional, and if the answer is

20Civ.8121, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *26 (S.D.N.Y., Jan.
04, 2021) (expressing the strict scrutiny test as requiring the
government to prove a substantial interest in limiting the
speech actions), Islamic American Relief Agency v. Unidentified
FBI Agents, 394 F.Supp 2d 34, 53 (D.D.C., 2005) (enumerating a
four element test to determine in limitations of free speech are
minimal enough to pass intermediate scrutiny).
145

See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno at 1135 (“is the

regulation with the power of the government? Does it promote an
important or substantial government interests?”).
146

See 50 U.S.C § 1701(a) (stating that the President has the

authority to declare a national emergency for any unusual and
extraordinary threat) (emphasis added)
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no, that mostly indicates to the Plaintiffs that they should be
challenging the order under other laws.147

The final question

regarding necessary infringement on First Amendment Freedoms is
the primary protection for U.S. persons subject to IEEPA
sanctions controls and solely ponders if the First Amendment
restrictions are minimal enough, but this is not sufficient.148
The balancing test employed by many courts bolsters the final
element marginally by requesting that the court considers the
consequences of their actions, but this is again inadequate
protection for individuals facing potential constitutional
infringements.149

147

See, Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno at 1135 (“Is [the

substantial government interest] unrelated to suppressing free
expression?”).
148

See e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d at 1135

(stating that the First Amendment infringements must be “minimal
enough” to be justified by the government and thus permissible).
149

See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 405, at *39-40 (noting that the brief for the
government argues that there is always a significant national
security and foreign policy interest at stake with sanctions and
an injunction would interfere with how the President determined
is best to proceed in the situation).
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An additional element of protection is necessary in the
form of adding a fifth question when applying this test to IEEPA
cases.150

The fifth element should question if there is

sufficient evidence that the restriction on First Amendment
rights is necessary to promulgate the purpose underlying the
regulation.151

This element would be analyzed in much the same

way as regulations challenged under the APA, with due deference
given to the enforcing agency and analysis of the stated record
to determine reasonableness.152

150

This standard would be used to

See Brief for Brennan Center for Justice as Amicus Curiae

Supporting Plaintiffs at 22, Open Soc’y for Justice v. Trump,
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405 (claiming that the Executive’s power
needs to be subject to “exacting judicial scrutiny” from the
federal courts who have interpretive power).
151

Cf. e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 405, at *28 (showing that it is significant to
determine if a restriction prohibits only speech the Government
believes is necessary to achieve its substantial interest).
152

See e.g., TikTok v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02658, 2020 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 232977, at *40 (D.D.C., Dec. 04, 2020) (citing Holy Land,
333 F.3d at 162) (following the well-established concept that
the arbitrary and capricious standard does not allow courts to
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maintain a level of deference to the enforcing agency while
providing an additional layer of protection for constitutional
rights without overly restricting presidential power granted by
IEEPA.153

Although the additional question is similar to some

existing intermediate scrutiny standards, it delineates between
breadth and necessity of First Amendment infringements.154

This

question directs courts to consider the necessity of the First
Amendment infringement for supporting the resolution of the
underlying national security threat whereas other tests look to
the quantity of First Amendment infringements to determine
reasonableness.155

undertake their own fact finding, but instead to review the
agency’s record for rational conclusions).
153

Cf. e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33

(2010) (emphasizing that the Executive is entitled to deference
when courts consider cases of involving interest in national
security and foreign affairs).
154

See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135

(9th Cir. 2000) (necessitating only that the restrictions on
First Amendment protected language be “no more than necessary”).
155

See generally id. at 1136 (seeking to determine whether the

statute is overbroad in its application of First Amendment
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In addition to this new element, courts should employ
independent fact-finding requirements with regards to the second
element questioning substantial government interest.156

This

step will protect plaintiffs from the government’s ability to
simply point to the so-called magic words used in almost every
IEEPA E.O. that says there is a substantial government interest
in the matter, and thus fulfilling the primary requirement of
previous intermediate scrutiny tests.157

This independent

studying would necessitate the President have justifiable
purposes for enacting the national emergency and provide
judicial oversight to ensure the purpose is valid after the
fact.158

This would also serve to mitigate the designation of

restrictions but not considering whether the restrictions
supported the initial purpose underlying the sanctions).
156

See e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, 148-79 (2008)

(arguing that judges should employ a level of independence that
allows them to act fairly).
157

Cf. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (authorizing the President to utilize

IEEPA powers when there is an unusual or extraordinary threat
that provides an interest in protecting the United States).
158

Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding that the

Judiciary has the power to review actions taken by the Executive
and deem them unconstitutional when relevant).
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individuals and organizations that cannot be proven as a
substantial threat to the national security of the United
States.159
By applying this test, courts will have a more equitable
balance of First Amendment rights protections while still
allowing the President to have a broad grant of power under
IEEPA.160

This test would formally solidify the reasoning used

in Open Society that protects U.S. Persons’ rights of free
speech and association from undue infringement when the
President declares a national emergency under IEEPA, but would
not overly restrict presidential power granted to the President

159

But see Remarks to the Press, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of

State (June 11, 2020)(on file with author) (justifying the
designation of an international human rights attorney because of
a claim that they are not pursuing real justice and claiming
that America must take this action in the pursuit of justice).
160

See e.g., 50 U.S.C. §1702(c) (authorizing judicial review of

sanctions regimes and records despite reliance on confidential
information); see also Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump,
No. 20Civ.8121, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *27 (S.D.N.Y, Jan.
04, 2021) (holding that when there is no basis to doubt the
Government’s legitimate interest in sanctions promulgation, the
Executive will be awarded deference).
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by IEEPA.161
The application of this test will not cause all IEEPA cases
to result in different holdings: for example, this test would
not modify the result of Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v.
United States.162

As to the first question of whether the

regulation is within the power of the government, IEEPA has been
upheld on multiple occasions as a constitutional delegation of
power to the President and the Department of Treasury.163

As to

the second question of whether there was an important or
substantial government interest in the regulation, the court
stated that due to the national security interest at stake, the

161

See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 405, at *40-*41 (finding that when a balance of
equities is conducted, the protection of First Amendment rights
outweighs that of the government but noting that in contentneutral cases this may garner different results).
162

See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. United States Dep't

of the Treasury, 585 F.Supp 1233, 1267 (D. Or., 2008) (holding
that the challenged law does not unnecessarily punish protected
free speech or violate the First Amendment).
163

See e.g., United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 212–13 (2d

Cir. 2006) (holding that IEEPA constitutes an appropriate
delegation of congressional authority to the executive).

59

government had a legitimate national security interest in
limiting the ability to finance terrorist organizations.164
Regarding the third question of whether the regulation is
unrelated to suppressing free expression or association, the
restrictions applied were for the purpose of limiting financial
support to terrorists above all other purposes and thus there
was only an incidental restriction of free speech.165

On the

fourth question of whether the regulation does or does not
substantially burden protected actions more than is necessary,
the limitations imposed by the sanctions program in that
instance did not punish a substantial amount of protected free
speech.166

On the final, new, question regarding whether the

incidental restriction is necessary to promote the purpose of

164

See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. United States Dep't

of the Treasury at 1267 (interpreting the E.O. and related
legislation as being tailored specifically to the prohibition of
financing terrorist organizations).
165

See id. (determining that the restrictions put forth in the

executive order are content neutral and do not directly infringe
on First Amendment rights as written).
166

See id. (finding that the regulation was targeted solely at

inhibiting individuals from financing terrorist organizations
which is not a right protected by the First Amendment).
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the E.O., the incidental restrictions on First Amendment rights
of speech and association would be justified for the greater
purpose of stemming assistance to terrorist groups.167
Conversely, the new question - whether the First Amendment
restrictions are necessary to promote the purpose of the E.O. would not permit overreaching infringements to First Amendment
rights akin to those seen in Open Society.168

The addition of

the fifth question would result in striking down the ICC
restrictions at least in part: the purpose of the E.O. was to
dissuade the ICC from investigating the United States’ alleged
war crimes, but the sanctions impeded speech actions related to
the advocacy for international rights of children in countries

167

See id. at 1266 (acknowledging that it is possible to conjure

a hypothetical where known humanitarian aid organizations such
become designated pursuant to the executive order but stating
that the mere possibility of this does not make the incidental
First Amendment restrictions impermissible).
168

See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 20Civ.8121,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *38-*39 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 04, 2021)
(finding the Plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm
as a result of having their First Amendment rights violated).
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experiencing armed conflicts.169
It is imperative that when the judiciary acts to constrain
presidential power it is maintaining neutrality and independence
as the Constitution requires.170

When the judiciary utilizes

this proposed test it will not overstep the bounds of neutrality
or independence because it will simply employ judicial
interpretation power.171

Throughout the history of the United

States, the judiciary has created tests to apply in analogous
situations and promote uniformity in results, this is the

169

Cf. id. at *7 (introducing one of the plaintiffs as a law

professor at the University of Georgia School of Law who was
previously trained for the ICC on matters relating to crimes
against children and children in warzones, but ceased these
actions because of Bensouda’s designation); see also id. at *22
(identifying the Government’s interest as exerting leverage over
the ICC and deterring them prom pursuing investigations).
170

Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding that the

Judiciary should uphold Article III and IV of the Constitution
when reviewing the constitutionality of actions taken by other
branches of the government).
171

See e.g., NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 557 (2014) (positing

that in all cases the Constitution must be interpreted in light
of the text, purpose, and experience as a nation).
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same.172

IV.

POLICY RECOMMENDATION
The best argument for the judiciary utilizing legitimate

First Amendment interests to restrict unilateral presidential
powers lies in the fact that the judiciary opened this so-called
can of worms to begin with.173

Due to the historic actions of

the court in removing oversight powers from Congress, resulting
in a broader grant of power to the President, a power vacuum has
opened that has allowed the President to act without oversight
in ways that neither Congress nor the judiciary intended.174
Until Congress opts to pass a resolution to constrain the
President’s unilateral power in regards to IEEPA without

172

See e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (creating the

first recognized intermediate scrutiny test to determine if the
state’s actions violated the First Amendment).
173

See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (limiting

Congress’s oversight of Presidential actions and designating the
judiciary as the ultimate check on presidential powers).
174

See Revision of Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup of H.R.

7738 Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977) (adopting the NEA and IEEPA as a way
to reform TWEA power that had become overreaching).

63

creating a political battleground, the burden falls to the
judiciary to reckon with the results of the precedent they
created.175
Until the Trump presidency, courts were on a clear trend of
expanding executive power by holding in favor of the government
in many cases challenging executive orders.176

While it is

unclear if this trend will continue, when cases were brought to
the courts that challenged clearly overreaching unilateral
declarations, it fell to the judiciary to act in its power as a
balance to the executive.177

175

By enforcing a standardized test

Cf. Limiting Emergency Powers Act of 2021, H.R. 63, 117th

Cong. §2(a) (as introduced in the House, Jan. 04, 2021)
(proposing an amendment to the NEA, and consequentially IEEPA,
that would force all declared national emergencies to expire
within thirty days of declaration is no parallel legislation has
been passed to support the declaration).
176

Erica Newland, Note, Executive Orders In Court, 124 YALE L.J.

2026, 2035, 2040 (2015) (reporting that after analyzing 297
judicial opinions on executive orders, more than 40% ruled in
favor of the government and thus expanded Executive power).
177

Cf. Marland v. Trump, No. 20-4597, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis

202572 at *20 (E.D. Penn., 2020) (holding that video content on
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that will result in analogous holdings across the board on
similar cases, the judiciary can use its power in the checksand-balances system to make it clear to the President that
infringement on Constitutional rights is not permissible.178
Further, there is a distinct interest in not over-burdening
the President in instances of national emergencies and threats
to national security.179

Creating a statutory limitation on the

President’s exercise of power in instances of national threats
may greatly inhibit the President’s ability to protect the
United States and its assets.180

The presence of the Berman

an app constitutes informational materials by analogizing the
content to artwork when presented with the novel question).
178

See Kenneth Lowande and Jon C. Rogowski, Presidential

Unilateral Power at 5 (hypothesizing that strategic Presidents
will see the pattern judicial and congressional oversight is
taking and tailor their unilateral powers so as to avoid their
mandates being overturned by the judiciary or by Congress).
179

See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY

ET AL,

supra note 19 at 27 (positing that

IEEPA is a source of authority for the President to quickly
impose economic sanctions in times of emergency without the
incumbrance of prior limitations).
180

Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2021) (excepting proposed rules
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Amendment, discussed above, provides statutory protection to
individuals by limiting the enforcement of sanctions, but does
not limit the President’s initial power in promulgating a
national emergency and IEEPA sanctions program.181

Other

protections of this kind are provided by OFAC in the form of
licenses that allow individuals to transact with sanctioned
parties in ways that may otherwise be construed as impermissible
under the President’s order.182

As such, the judiciary can work

involving “foreign affairs” from the note and comment process
generally mandated under the APA thus removing a substantial
barrier to implementation of rules).
181

See generally Exec. Order No. 13873,84 Fed. Reg. 22689, 22690

(acknowledging that the order targeting the ICC would be
implemented consistent with applicable laws); but see Open Soc’y
Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 20Civ.8121, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 405, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 04, 2021) (recognizing the
government’s argument that the order was enacted with the caveat
that the IEEPA and Berman Amendment applied, but still stating
that if OFAC enforced the order against the Plaintiff’s actions
it would violate the Berman Amendment).
182

See U.S. DEP’T

OF

TREASURY FAQ https://home.treasury.gov/policy-

issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/topic/1506 (last visited Mar.
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in tandem with the statutory exemptions and OFAC licensing
structures by enforcing post-enactment constraints on unilateral
presidential powers through legal challenges.183

This strikes

the best balance of constraint and grant of power as it protects
individuals from liability without creating a complex
bureaucratic process that delays the President from acting in
instances that require immediate response.184
The United States also holds a unique power in that the

21, 2021) (defining a general license as a broad allowance for
any party to conduct transactions that would otherwise be
prohibited whereas a specific license as written individualized
and narrow approval to conduct transactions otherwise limited).
183

Cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25 (2010)

(“concerns of national security and foreign relations do not
warrant abdication of the judicial role.”). See e.g.,
Publication of Web General Licenses Issued Pursuant to the
Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 76,450, 76,450
(Nov. 30, 2020) (issuing General Licenses allowing exports that
were previously prohibited by E.O.s issued between 2015-2019).
184

See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY

ET AL,

supra note 19 at 1 (recognizing

that IEEPA is a useful tool for the President to quickly
implement their will or the will of Congress).
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entire world is wary of U.S. sanctions regimes.185

The penalties

for violating U.S. sanctions are high and chill a significant
amount of trade and investment that may be permitted, but
because it is too close to the line of legality, individuals
will err on the side of caution to avoid liability.186

While

this power is a strength for the United States, it must be
exercised in equitable ways that do not chill, say, support for
victims of humanitarian violations in Syria.187

185

Sanctions are

See, Aron Lund, Briefing: Just How ‘Smart’ Are Sanctions on

Syria?, THE NEW HUMANITARIAN (April 25, 2019),
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2019/04/25/briefingjust-how-smart-are-sanctions-syria (contending that European
investors are warier of U.S. sanctions than E.U. sanctions).
186

See id. (maintaining that although parties in the

humanitarian sector are exempted from American sanctions, when
those organizations attempt to deal with banks and other private
sector actors there is a “chilling effect” caused by the
existence of a sanctions regime that causes the humanitarian
organizations to struggle with carrying out their purpose).
187

See id. (proposing that the United States make better use of

humanitarian aid exemptions in sanctions regimes to prevent
further harming the individuals they purport to be advocating
for with the sanctions regimes).
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currently the path of least resistance, but they may not always
be the best option.188

Court’s ability to act as a check on the

executive is imperative in ensuring that the United States’
sanctions regimes do not impermissibly overstep their purpose.189

V.

CONCLUSION
Since Congress’s grant of power to the President to impose

sanctions under IEEPA, those powers have constantly expanded in
scope.190

188

When considering the best method the judiciary can

See Press Statement, Antony J. Bilken, Secretary of State,

Ending Sanctions and Visa Restrictions against Personnel of the
International Criminal Court (April 2, 2021) (on file with
author) (announcing the revocation of sanctions against the ICC
and acknowledging that concerns about the ICC’s activities are
better addressed through engagement with other State parties
rather than through imposition of sanctions).
189

See id. (acknowledging that the imposition of sanctions is

not always the most effective or pertinent way to induce the ICC
to cease its investigations).
190

See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY

ET AL,

supra note 19 at 17-18 (inspecting

trends in IEEPA sanctions and finding that IEEPA sanctions, on
average, last longer and are declared for vaguer reasons than
TWEA’s previous sanctions regimes).
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take to limit the overbroad reach of this power, the First
Amendment is the most successfully used Plaintiff’s argument
against potentially over-reaching sanctions.191

The court in

Opens Society Justice Initiative v. Trump recognized that the
broad language used in many E.O.s gives rise to
unconstitutionally limiting freedom of speech.192

A more

stringent check on the language and implementation of sanctions
pursuant to IEEPA can act as an effective balancing against
executive power to ensure the President is not enacting
overreaching sanctions that do not promote the purpose of IEEPA
as a control on terrorism and legitimate national emergencies.193

191

See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No 20Civ.8121

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *40-41 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 04, 2021)
(holding in favor of the Plaintiffs to grant injunctive relief
and enjoin the government from enforcing civil or criminal
liability against the enumerated activities that Plaintiffs
believed may give rise to such liability).
192

See id. at *40-41 (holding that the proffered national

security justification alone was insufficient in the face of
Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights claims).
193

See e.g., Trump Twitter Archive,

https://www.thetrumparchive.com (type “try looking” into the
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As a result of closer inspection of First Amendment restrictions
imposed by IEEPA sanctions, courts will necessarily need a new
test to assess the threat.194

This new test must balance the

legitimate interests of the United States Government in the
protection of national security and enforcing foreign policy
with the First Amendment rights of individuals who are directly
impacted by the promulgation of these sanctions.195

As Congress

has not created a carveout to IEEPA powers in more than three
decades, the courts taking this step to constrain presidential
power assures the protection of First Amendment rights without
requiring Congress to surmount the difficult task of legislating

search bar) (substantiating the assertion that at least some
past Presidents believe IEEPA grants them broad powers outside
the scope of those intended).
194

See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 405, at * 17, 21, 39 (combining multiple elements and
balancing analyses to come to the conclusion that Plaintiff’s
First Amendment rights were violated and thus demonstrating a
potential need for a novel test on this subject).
195

Cf. id. at *40 (reiterating the necessity of balancing

legitimate public interests but asserting there is no legitimate
interest in enforcing unconstitutional laws and actions).
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modified Executive powers.196

This move to protect

constitutional rights is one that courts are ready and willing
to take on, and with this modified test they have the resources
to enact equitable justice in the face of national security
concerns.

196

Cf. e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3) (amending IEEPA in 1988 to

exclude informational materials, the last substantive
restriction placed on presidential powers under IEEPA).
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